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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BANKRUPTCY: SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFICIARY MAY
QUALIFY FOR USE OF WAGE-EARNER PLAN
IN In Re Bradford,' the United States District Court for the North-
ern District of Alabama recognized an expansion of the class of per-
sons who may utilize the Bankruptcy Act's wage-earners' plans,2 hold-
ing that social security benefits are "income derived from wages"
within the statutory definition of "wage-earner." 3 During the course
of a proceeding brought pursuant to the Act,4 John Bradford, Jr.,
filed a petition with the district court seeking an extended period of
time in which to pay his debts. The evidence indicated that Bradford
had worked for wages throughout his adult life, had never owned nor
managed a business, had never depended upon investment or prop-
erty income, and since retirement had lived solely on social security
benefits of sixty-four dollars per month and a twenty-one dollar per
month state pension. The debts which he had incurred were per-
sonal loans, typical of those commonly made by small loan com-
panies to persons of limited financial means. Despite Bradford's
modest income, there was no evidence that his proposed wage-earner
plan was likely to fail. A majority of his thirteen creditors, both in
number and in amount, approved the plan; but one firm objected,
arguing that Bradford was not a "wage-earner" within the ambit of
the statute. The appointed referee in bankruptcy rejected this con-
tention and entered an order approving the plan submitted by Brad-
ford. Upon petition for review by the dissenting creditor, the district
court affirmed the decision, emphasizing that both public policy and
legislative intent favored the use of the wage-earner plan to pay debts,
rather than a procedure in straight bankruptcy to discharge them.5
Under the present wage-earner plan, a debtor "whose principal
income is derived from wages, salary or commissions,"0 and who is
268 F. Supp. 896 (N.D. Ala. 1967).
2 Bankruptcy Act §§601-86, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1001-86 (1964).
8 Id. § 606(8), 11 U.S.C. § 1006(8) ("an individual whose principal income is de-
rived from wages, salary or commissions.").
4 See id. §§ 621-24, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1021-24.
6 268 F. Supp. at 897.
6 Bankruptcy Act § 606 (8), 11 U.S.C. § 1006 (8) (1964).
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insolvent or unable to meet maturing obligations,7 is eligible to file
in the United States District Court, for a nominal fee,8 a petition
proposing an extension and/or composition of his debts.9 There-
after, an appointed referee in bankruptcy, or the court,10 holds a
meeting of the debtor and his creditors to evaluate both the plan
which the debtor submits and the creditors' claims.1 If all "affected"
creditors accept the plan, the referee, acting for the court,'2 confirms
the plan without further inquiry13 and appoints a trustee to admin-
ister it under court control.' 4 If an affected creditor does not accept
the proposed plan, however, the debtor must apply for confirma-
tion,'5 for which he is eligible if the plan has been accepted by a
majority, both in number and in amount, of his unsecured creditors
and by all of his secured creditors whose claims are "dealt with" by
the plan.16 After review, the referee will grant confirmation if the
plan is in the best interests of the creditors, is feasible, and is sub-
mitted in good faith and in conformity with other statutory pro-
visions.'7 As an exercise of a judicial function, the referee's deter-
mination is always subject to review,' 8 initially by the district court. 9
If a confirmation is not appealed or is affirmed on review, the original
confirming court retains exclusive supervisory jurisdiction over the
debtor's property and income during the life of the plan,20 which may
extend to three years.2 ' Upon completion of the required install-
ment payments, the court must discharge the debtor; 22 and it may
discharge him at the expiration of three years even if the plan is in-
complete where failure is attributable to "circumstances for which
the debtor could not justly be held accountable."' '
7 Id. §623, 11 U.S.C. § 1023.8 Id. § 633, 11 U.S.C. § 1033 ("payment ... not to exceed $15").
0 See id. §§ 612, 2 (a) (1), 621-22, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1012, 11 (a) (1), 1021-22.
10 Id. § 631, 11 U.S.C. § 1031 (unless judge otherwise directs, clerk to refer proceed-
ing to referee).
'
1 ld. §§ 632-33, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1032-33.
112 See id. § 1 (9), 11 U.S.C. § 1 (9).
1 Id. §651, 11 U.S.C. § 1051.
1"Bankruptcy Act § 633 (4), 11 U.S.C. § 1033 (4) (1964).
'Id. § 652, 11 U.S.C. § 1052.
1 0 Id. § 652 (1), 11 U.S.C. § 1052 (1).
l7Id. § 656, 11 U.S.C. § 1056.
18 Weidhorn v. Levy, 253 U.S. 268 (1920); Bankruptcy Act § 38, 11 U.S.C. § 66 (1964).
IO Bankruptcy Act §§ 1 (10), 2 (a) (10), 11 U.S.C. §§ 1 (10), 11 (a) (10) (1964).
20 d. §§611, 658, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1011, 1058.
I See id. § 661, 11 U.S.C. § 1061.
32 Id. § 660, 11 U.S.C. § 1060.
" Id. § 661, 11 U.S.C. § 1061.
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Studies have shown that the great majority of wage-earner plans
function properly, and significantly increase a creditor's recovery
above that which he might reasonably expect if a debtor were to
to be subjected to straight bankruptcy.24 Furthermore, although
straight bankruptcy has a superficial and often ephemeral advantage
in its total discharge of debts, the wage-earner plan is thought to have
an instructive, rehabilitative effect on the individual debtor with
concomitant social benefits, i.e., teaching him the necessity and
means of proper conduct of his financial affairs and protecting him
from the loss of necessities by garnishment or attachment. 25 Despite
its advantages, however, the wage-earner plan has not yet met ex-
tensive utilization,2 though commentators and Congress have urged
a more widespread usage in appropriate cases.27  This attitude has
resulted in expansion of the class entitled to utilize the procedure
through periodic congressional addition to the permitted maximum
income precedent to use of the plan.28  In its most recent amendment
to the wage-earner plan, Congress redefined "wage-earner" to elim-
inate monetary qualifications and changed the phrasing from "one
who works" to "one whose principal income is derived from wages." 2
The committee reports articulated no reason for the apparent relaxa-
tion of the standard;30 but the new wording, coupled with the clear
congressional intent to foster greater use of the plan, has led some
referees to approve wage-earner plans contemplating payment from
friends, unemployment compensation, and retirement benefits.3 '
2
'E.g., Dolphin, The Economic Feasibility of Chapter XII, 20 Bus. LAWYER 477,
479 (1965); Hilliard & Hurt, Wage Earner Plans under Chapter XII of the Bank-
ruptcy Act, 19 Bus. LAWYER 271, 272 (1963); McDuffee, The Wage Earner's Plan in
Practice, 15 VANm. L. Rav. 173, 188 (1961); Comment, The Wage Earner Plan-A
Superior Alternative to Straight Bankruptcy, 9 UTAH L. R v. 730, 736 (1965) [herein-
after cited as 9 UTAR L. REv. 730 (1965)].
2 5 E.g., Hilliard & Hurt, supra note 24, at 273-74; 9 UTAH L. REv. 730, 737 (1965).
26E.g., Comment, 45 MARQUErE L. REv. 582, 583 (1962); 9 UTAH L. REv. 730, 743
(1965); 64 W. VA. L. Rav. 217, 218 (1962).
2 E.g., S. REP. No. 179, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); H.R. REP. No. 193, 86th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1959); Hilliard & Hurt, supra note 24; 9 UTAH L. REv. 730 (1965); 64 W. VA.
L. REv. 217 (1962). But see Walker, Is Chapter XIII a Milestone on the Path to the
Welfare State?, 33 REF. J. 7 (1959).
2 Bankruptcy Act § 606(8), 11 U.S.C. § 1006(8) (1964), formerly 64 Stat. 1134
(1950), amending 52 Stat. 930 (1938).
2 9
1d.
30 See S. REP. No. 179, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); H.R. REP. No. 193, 86th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1959).
31 See O'Neill, Wage Earner's Plan, in PRocyEDINcS OF THIRD SEMINAR FOR REFEREES
IN BANKRUPTCY 399, 404 (1966); O'Neill, Wage Earner's Plan, in PROCEEvINGs OF SEc-
OND SEMINAR FOR REFEREES IN BANKRUPTCY 433, 437 (1965).
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Adopting this expansive approach, the referee in Bradford
confirmed the retired debtor's plan for an extension of his debt pay-
ments, concluding that he was a "wage-earner" within the purview
of the Act. On appeal, an examination of the historical develop-
ment of the wage-earner plan convinced the district court of a con-
tinuing intent to promote the availability of the plan.32 The court
observed that in Perry v. Commerce Loan Company33 the Supreme
Court had also expressed an underlying policy of encouragement of
wage-earner plans, lending support to a liberal interpretation of
the Act in order to effectuate its beneficial purposes.34 Furthermore,
the court noted that petitioner's submission of stricter definitions of
"wage-earner" from cases dealing with the statutory exemption from
involuntary bankruptcy was unavailing, since the latest amendment
to the wage-earner plan had significantly altered the statutory
language.3 5 Emphasizing the amended wording, the court held that
since social security and other retirement benefits are financed largely
by employee contributions which would otherwise have been received
as wages or salary, such benefits are "income derived from wages"
within the meaning of section 606 (8) of the Bankruptcy Act.3 6 A
contrary definition, the court concluded, would be an irrational
denial of relief to a significant portion of the population which,
although now retired, had always worked for a living.
It is generally accepted that the wage-earner procedure is bene-
ficial to the individual debtor, his creditors, and society, and that
former wage-earners should be able to take advantage of this
demonstrably superior alternative to straight bankruptcy. Since
no minimum financial requirement limits the use of the wage-
earner plan, and since social security and other retirement benefits
are at least as regular as wages, no reasonable basis exists for dis-
tinguishing between persons actively employed and those retired in
the determination of the availability of the plan. However, because
the income of pensioners and social security recipients would gen-
erally be substantially less than that of a typical wage-earner, close
scrutiny of the feasibility of a plan presented by such a petitioner
82 268 F. Supp. at 897-98.
Ss 383 U.S. 392 (1966).
8 268 F. Supp. at 898.
85Compare Bankruptcy Act § 1 (32), 11 U.S.C. § 1(32), with Bankruptcy Act
§ 606(8), 11 U.S.C. § 1006(8) (1964).
Il 268 F. Supp. at 899.
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seems necessary. Although there was no indication in the instant
case that the plan was impracticable, the debtor's income was only
eighty-five dollars per month-a figure suggesting that the debtor
could find it difficult to meet both the installment payments and his
normal living expenses. Also to be considered is whether a plan
is sought merely to delay a straight bankruptcy, to which a debtor
may convert his plan without penalty.3 7 Such caveats apply equally,
however, to all petitions for a wage-earner proceeding and are not
reasons to prohibit appropriate use of the plan in cases of retire-
ment beneficiaries. With conscientious analysis in each case of the
relevant factors-interests of the parties, good faith, and feasibility-
the wage-earner plan should be as beneficial to retired persons as it
has proved to be for active wage-earners.
37 Bankruptcy Act § 666, 11 U.S.C. § 1066 (1964).
